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Federal Trade Commission Proceedings and Section 5
of the Clayton Act: Application and Implications
Although the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the
antitrust laws falls upon governmental agencies, Congress has recognized the effectiveness of the private suit for damages as a deterrent
and has sought to encourage such actions by providing for the recovery of treble damages by an injured party.1 To assist the private
litigant, whose problem of proof is formidable,2 Congress enacted
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,3 which allows the introduction, as
prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation, of a prior judgment
or decree obtained by the Government. As a further aid to private
litigants, section 5(b) 4 provides for the tolling of the applicable stat-

1. Clayton Act § 4, 88 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
2. See Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167, 171 (1958).
3. Clayton Act § 5(a), 88 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964):
A final judgment or decree • • • rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a of this title,
as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel
as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to
consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to
judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title.
Section 15a provides that the United States may sue to recover actual damages when
it is injured in its business or property by reason of any practice prohibited by the
antitrust laws. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1964).
4. Clayton Act § 5(b). 88 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964):
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States
to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not
including an action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of

April 1966]

Notes

1157

ute of limitations5 during the pendency of a civil or criminal action
by the Government founded upon the same violation alleged in the
private suit. For more than fifty years, the only type of government
proceeding that suspended the statute of limitations was a Justice
Department action to enforce the antitrust laws. In the recent case
of Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co., 6 however, the United States Supreme Court held that proceedings instituted by the _Federal Trade Commission are also within
the scope of section 5(b) of the Clayton Act. It is the purpose of this
note to consider the implications of the Minnesota Mining decision
for the future application of section 5 to private actions.
Since the FTC and the Justice Department have concurrent jurisdiction, under section 11 of the Clayton Act,7 to enforce certain
provisions of the antitrust laws, the questions have naturally arisen
whether an FTC order is admissible, under section 5(a), against the
defendant in a subsequent civil suit, and whether an FTC proceeding will toll the statute of limitations; through the application of
section 5(b).
Before 1963, courts had twice considered the admissibility of
FTC orders as prima fade evidence in a private suit. In Proper v.
John Bene & Sons, 8 it was held that FTC orders were inadmissible,
primarily on the ground that they were not "final" as required by
section 5(a). In 1945, when the question was again presented, the
court in Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling &
Billiard Corp. 9 initially held that the Wheeler-Lea Act of 193910
made FTC orders "final" and therefore admissible under section
5(a). On rehearing, however, the court held that the Wheeler-Lea
Act did not apply to section 11 orders of the FTC.11
Within the past few years the controversy over FTC proceedings
has shifted from their admissibility under section 5(a) to the tolling
provision of section ·5(b). Before the Supreme Court decision in
Minnesota Mining, three courts had held that FTC proceedings
limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and
based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall
be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter . • • •
5. Clayton Act § 4(b), added by 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964). :Before
1955 there was no uniform federal statute of limitations for a treble damage action;
hence, the period varied depending upon state law.
6. 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
7. Clayton Act § 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964), gives
the FTC and four other administrative agencies the power to enforce §§ 2, 3, 7, and
8 of the Clayton Act where applicable to their special area of interest. See note 43
infra.
8. 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
9. 150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. 52 Stat. lll (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1964), amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
11. 150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945).

1158

Michiga_n Law Review

[Vol. 64

were not capable of tolling the statute of limitations.12 Each relied
on Proper to some extent and emphasized that both the language
and the legislative history of section 5 indicate that it was intended
to apply only to judjcial, rather than administrative, proceedings.
Each court assumed that the subsections were interdependent-that
the purpose of section 5(b) was to toll the statute of limitations to
allow a private party the use, under section 5(a), of the judgment
that the Government might obtain.13 Since FTC orders could not be
used as prima fade evidence, the courts held that FTC proceedings
would not toll the statute of limitations. 14 The circuit court in Minnesota Mining15 took the contrary view. Although it did not agree
with the assumption that the two subsections were entirely interdependent, the court nevertheless decided that FTC proceedings tolled
the statute of limitations because it believed FTC orders to be admissible as prima fade evidence.16
The Supreme Court, in affirming Minnesota Mining, refused to
go as far as the circuit court, and expressly declined to consider the
issue whether FTC orders are admissible under section 5(a). Instead, the Court found legislative history and language in the section
itself indicating that the subsections are not completely interdependent.17 Thus, it was unnecessary to find FTC orders admissible before the proceedings would toll the statute of limitations. The Court
admitted that there is "little in the legislative history to suggest that
Congress consciously intended to include Commission actions" 18
12. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 96'7 (D. Me.
1963); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. '112 (E.D. Tenn,
1963); Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 327 F.2d '125 (8th Cir. 1964).
13. E.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 96'7, 971
(D. Me. 1963).
14. E.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. '112, '118
(E.D. Tenn. 1963).
15. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 846
(3d Cir. 1964).
16. Id. at 357.
17. 381 U.S. 3ll, 316-18 (1965). The Court's interpretation was subsequently reaffirmed in Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965), which held that the
principles of collateral estoppel, applicable to determinations under § 5(a), are not ,
applicable to § 5(b). The lower court had relied on Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956), to hold that the same means must be used
by the same defendants to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies in
order for the tolling provision to apply. In overruling the lower court and the Steiner
view, the Supreme Court pointed out that Minnesota Mining had rejected the con•
tention that §§ 5(a) and 5(b) were coextensive. 382 U.S. at 58·59. The Lea decision
resolved a three-year conflict between circuits on this point in favor of the standard
applied in Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962),
that there need be only "substantial identity of subject matter" in order to claim the
benefit of the tolling provision of § 5(b). This interpretation seems more in keeping
with the language of the section and with the policy of extending § 5 aid to as large
a group of private plaintiffs as possible.
18. 381 U.S. 3ll, 320 (1965). There is some evidence that administrative proceedings
were not intended to be included. See id. at 324-35 (Black, J., dissenting).
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within the scope of section 5, and that "the precise language of
§ 5(b) does not clearly encompass Commission proceedings."19 However, it argued that these considerations should not be controlling
when they run counter to the purpose of Congress to permit private
litigants any benefits they might gain from prior government actions, regardless of the subsequent usefulness of the judgments as
prima fade evidence.20
The impact of the Court's decision in Minnesota Mining has
been made apparent in the recent case of Broussard v. Socony Mobil
Oil Co.21 In dictum, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
critical of the district court's refusal to permit the plaintiff to serve
an FTC employee with certain interrogatories concerning the existence and nature of complaints made against the defendant by the
Government. Citing language in Minnesota Mining to the effect
that "government proceedings are recognized as a major source of
evidence for private parties, " 22 the court stated that plaintiff should
have been permitted to seek the information relevant to his suit.23
In the past, the release of this type of information has been at the
discretion of the Commission,24 but Broussard suggests that an injured party has a right to know when the FTC is conducting an investigation, so that he may decide whether to bring his suit or wait
for the results of an FTC proceeding.
Allowing FTC proceedings to toll the statute of limitations for
private treble damage suits might also result in a substantial increase
in the number of consent orders entered into by the FTC in negotiated settlements.25 If a defendant corporation believed that it
might be faced with substantial treble damage suits, it could minimize the effect of the tolling provision of section 5(b) by giving the
FTC an assurance of voluntary compliance or accepting a consent
order to cease and desist. 26 The desirability to a corporate defendant
of accepting a consent order would be even greater if, after a litigated
19. Id. at 321.
20. Ibid.
21. 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965).
22. 381 U.S. 311, 319 (1965).
23. 350 F.2d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 1965).
24. The rules of the Commission do not expressly allow for disclosure of this type
of information, but the Commission may furnish the information if "deemed advisable." 16 C.F.R. § l.134(d). As to a private litigant's right to information obtained
by the government in a Justice Department proceeding, see Olympic Refining Co. v.
Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964).
25. FTC Proceedings and Treble Damage Actions, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 50121
(1965).
26. In the past, the number of consent decrees issued in cases involving charges on
which treble damage suits could be based has been smaller than the number of litigated
proceedings involving the same type of charges. Ibid. However, if the bill introduced
by Senator Hart (see note 39 infra) is enacted, consent decrees will also be prima facie
evidence in subsequent private damage actions.
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proceeding, an FTC order could be used as prima facie evidence in
a subsequent treble damage action, 27 because consent decrees entered before testimony is taken are not admissible as prima facie
evidence under section 5(a).28 The Commission may find this reduction of the amount of extended litigation desirable from the standpoint of efficient antitrust enforcement, but may, on the other hand,
be reluctant to accept consent orders which would deprive an injured party of the benefit of a final FTC order as evidence in a later
private action.
Although the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide the
question in Minnesota Mining, the plain implication of that opinion is that under the proper circumstances FTC orders are admissible as prima facie evidence. Conspicuous by its absence from the
Court's opinion is a consideration of the language of section 5(b) to
the effect that only a "civil or criminal proceeding ... instituted by
the United States"29 will toll the statute of limitations. As FTC proceedings are now, under Minnesota Mining, within the scope of
section 5(b), the necessary inference is that they are within that description, which is also essentially the description of the type of
proceeding which produces judgments or decrees admissible as prima
facie evidence under section 5(a).30 Thus, if Congress intended the
same meaning for substantially identical expressions in sections 5(a)
and (b),31 the Court has eliminated without discussion one of the
main objections to admitting FTC orders as evidence: that an FTC
Zl. Some courts have indicated that the primary purpose of § 5 is to encourage
consent decrees. For example, in United States v. Brunswick-Balke•Collcnder Co., 203
F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962), the court expressed the belief "that the benefits to
treble damage claimants come into being and inure only when defendants have failed
to take advantage of the inducement offered to them in that section." Id. at 662,
28. The Justice Department has successfully avoided this circumvention by defcn•
dants of a potential disadvantage under § 5(a) by incorporating in the consent decree
a clause admitting liability and conceding guilt, limited, however, to use by state
agencies as prima facie evidence. United States v. Lake Asphalt &: Petroleum Co., 1960
Trade Cas. 77271 (D. Mass. 1960). Contra, United States v. Brunswick•Balke-Collender
Co., supra note 27. In United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964), the
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the Justice Department could insist on an
admission of guilt, but there seems to be no reason why such a clause could not be
used in place of a § 5(a) judgment. See Comment, 53 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 627, 639 (1965).
See generally Dabney, Consent Decrees Without Consent, 63 CoLUM, L. R.Ev. 1053
(1963); Matteoni, Antitrust Ambiguity Under Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 11
U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 792 (1964) (nolo contendere pleas).
29. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
30. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964) reads in part: "judg•
ment or decree .•• rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on
behalf of the United States ••.•"
31. This is the universal presumption. See, e.g., MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUC•
'110N § 13 (1953). Furthermore, it would seem that the words "by or on behalf of"
strengthen this construction, as they are more inclusive than the § o(b) terminology
of "instituted by."
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proceeding cannot be considered a civil or criminal proceeding
instituted by the United States.32
However, section 5(a) includes the phrase "final judgments or
decrees," which necessitates the investigation of two further questions: whether an FTC order is final, and whether it is a "judgment
or decree." The circuit court in Minnesota Mining argued persuasively that the "Finality Act," a 1959 amendment to the Clayton
Act88 which makes FTC orders final unless appealed, gives such
orders the force and effect of final judgments.84 These orders now
constitute complete relief without application to a federal court of
appeals for execution, which would seem to supply the "finality"
that the court in Brunswick found lacking in 1945.35
On the other hand, there is no simple answer to the question
whether an FTC order is to be considered a "judgment or decree." 36
Aside from the consideration of whether the non-judicial character
and functions of the Commission should preclude its orders from
admissibility under section 5(a),37 courts will probably be reluctant
to equate an administrative order with a judicial decree because of
the relaxed evidentiary standard under which such decrees are obtained. 38 However, as the circuit court in Minnesota Mining pointed
32. Both Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir.
1964), and New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d
346 (3d Cir. 1964), considered this argument at length before reaching opposite conclusions.
•
\
33. Clayton Act § ll(g), 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(g) (1964), amending 38
Stat. 734 (1914), provides that FI'C orders "shall b.ecome final-(!) upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has
been duly filed within such time •.••" It should be noted, however, that this section
makes FI'C orders final "orders,"· not final "judgments."
34. 332 F.2d 346, 354-55 (3d Cir. 1964).
35. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling&: Billiard Corp., 150 F.2d
69 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945); see Matteoni, An Antitrust Agreement:
Whether a Federal Tade Commission Order Is Within the Ambit of the Clayton Act's
Section 5, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158, 162-63 (1965).
36. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
3ll, 326 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
37. It has been suggested that the FI'C was created as a commission of experts to
deal with complex economic problems and that its effectiveness is greatly impaired
by an insistence on formal legalistic procedures. Markham, The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Economics, 64 CoLUM, L. REv. 405 (1964). An intensive discussion of
the function and goals of an administrative agency is beyond the scope of this note.
38. "The competency of a government judgment in a private suit is necessarily
restricted to the requirements of due process. But the tolling of the statute during the
pendency of the government litigation is not so limited." Union Carbide &: Carbon
Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 569 (1962). However, there are instances of an administrative order used as prima facie evidence in judicial proceedings. Under the ICC Act,
25 Stat. 859 (1889), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964), a reparation order of the ICC
is admissible as prima facie evidence in an action for damages by a shipper against
a defendant found to have exceeded reasonable rates. See Meeker &: Co. v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412 (1915); Hackney Bros. Body Co. v. New York Central R.R.,
85 F. Supp. 465,467 (E.D.N.C. 1949), It has been held, however, that the ICC's primary
jurisdiction as to questions of reasonableness makes a reparation order a prerequisite
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out, this factor should affect only the weight of the order as evidence
and not its admissibility.39 The judgment may relieve the plaintiff
of the burden of proof, but it does not estop the defendant from subsequent rebuttal. 4° Furthermore, it has been noted that the "standards of admissibility are relaxed, but the fundamental standards of
proof, as developed in law courts, are generally followed." 41 To help
ensure fairness in the proceedings, the FTC operates under an internal separation of functions so that investigators and prosecutors
do not also sit as judges.42 Mo:r_eover, it is possible that any existing
abuses of the FTC procedure would be somewhat alleviated if the
Commission's ¢1.ecrees were within the scope of section 5(a), since
the Commission would be forced to consider the interests of subsequent private litigants. Nevertheless, regardless of the desirability of
bringing FTC orders within the ambit of section 5(a), the courts
may be reluctant to do so; 43 such a departure may therefore require
appropriate legislation.44
to a civil damage action. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,, 359 U.S. 464 (1959): 62
CoLUM, L. R.Ev. !?21 (1962).
39. 332 F.2d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 1964). A bill recently introduced by Senator Hart
of Michigan would amend § 5(a) to make a final judgment or decree conclusive
evidence if entered after the commencement of the taking o( testimony in a civil
or criminal proceeding, and prima fade evidence if entered before the taking of
testimony. S. 2512, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 8, 1965). If a judgment could be offered
as conclusive evidence, it seems unlikely that decrees resulting from proceedings other
than judicial proceedings would be used because there would be no opportunity to
consider the weight of the judgment as evidence. Making decrees entered before the
taking of testimony prima fade evidence would discourage respondents from entering
into consent decrees to escape possible treble damage claims.
40. Hardy, The Evisceration of Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 49 GEO, L.J. 44, 49
(1960).
41. COOPER, THE LAWYER AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 198 (1957). For a criticism
of FTC procedure, see Loughlin, Investigation and Trial of Robinson-Patman Act
Cases Before the Federal Trade Commission, 4 ANTITRUST BULL, 741 (1959).
42. Matteoni, supra note 35, at 165. It has been argued that this is still inadequate
and that the prosecuting arm of the Commission should be entirely severed from
the judicial arm. Barton, The Federal Trade Commission and the Need for Procedural
Impartiality, 64 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 390 (1964).
43. In the second trial of Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F.
Supp. 510, 514 (E.D. Mo. 1965), the court allowed the plaintiff to plead the dates of
the FTC proceedings and the nature of the matter before the Commission in order
to toll the statute of limitations but refused to allow the decrees of the previous FTC
proceedings to be admitted as evidence.
44. The 1964 Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission, reprinted in part
in 5 CCH TRADE REc. REP. ,i 50106 (1965), proposed that § 5(a) be amended to include
final orders of the FTC. Section 11 of the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 2l(a) (1964)) also permits the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Reserve
Board to enforce §§ 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act where applicable to their par•
ticular area of interest. If FTC orders could be used as prima fade evidence, there
is the possibility that the other agencies may be considered within the scope of § 5,
It would be necessary, however, to examine the special circumstances involved in
each agency's proq!edings before thus expanding the applicability of § 5(a), Mattconi,
supra note 35, at 169.
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Whether it is accomplished by judicial interpretation or legisla- .
tive amendment, there are strong arguments for including FTC orders within the scope of section 5(a). First, the FTC defendant is
protected by his right to judicial review of the FTC order to determine whether the conclusions of the Commission are supported by
substantial evidence.45 Second, unappealed orders of the FTC have
been accorded a res judicata effect between the defendant and other
agencies of the federal govemment,46 and section 5(a) requires
only that the facts and judgments established at the government
proceeding be such as would work estoppel between the government
and the respondent at that proceeding before they may be used as
prima fade evidence in the private action. 47 Finally, it is certainly
unfair and, it has been suggested, possibly unconstitutional to apply
section 5 to Justice Department prosecutions but not to FTC proceedings.48 At present, the private plaintiff's rights, and the corresponding liability of the defendant, may tum on the governmental
decision as to which agency brings the action. Such inequality of
treatment, which may amount to a· denial of due process, could be
corrected by including FTC orders within the language of both subsections of section 5.
Successful prosecution of a private antitrust suit frequently depends upon the availability of a government judgment, heretofore
only those judgments obtained by the Justice Department.49 If FTC
orders are held admissible as prima fade evidence, it is probable that
an increase in private actions will result. 50 The desirability of such
an increase in private enforcement should be apparent. Private ac45. Clayton Act § ll(c), 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2I(c) (1964).
46. United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1944).
47. Clayton Act § 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
See Note, 53 GEO. L.J. 481, 491 (1965).
48. Butler, Application and Construction of Tolling of Statute of Limitations Provisions of Section 5, Clayton Act, in Cases of Dual Enforcement Jurisdiction, 8 ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 42, 47 (1956).
49. As of 1953, approximately 90% of private suits filed followed government
action, and, although the percentage had declined somewhat by 1958, 76% to 78%
of private antitrust actions could_ still be traced to successful goverment suits. Bicks,
The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL.
5, 7 (1959). Sometimes a particular government action will give rise to many private
actions. As of June 30, 1962, there were 1,782 pending private antitrust actions in the
electrical industry which were filed in the wake of the so-called Philadelphia electrical
cases. Timberlake, Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 9 N.Y.L.F. ,145 (1963).
50. It should be noted that the FTC is the primary enforcer of § 2 (38 Stat. 730
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964) (discriminatory practices)), and § 3 (38 Stat.
731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) (exclusive dealing)), of the Clayton Act. Hansen,
Functioning of the Antitrust Division-Its Relationship to the Federal Trade Commission and Current Policies of the Division, 13 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LA-W 20,
22 (1958). Since violations of these sections cause more immediate injury to a greater
number of private parties than do other .violations, the range of antitrust exposure
faced by FTC respondents would be likely to increase. FTC Proceedings and Treble
Damage Actions, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,r 50121 (1965).
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tions compensate for the economic injury caused by antitrust violations, thereby heightening the financial impact, and consequently
the deterrent value, of government civil and criminal actions. Gl Furthermore, it has been suggested that the private action, rather than
enforcement by a central government agency, is more in keeping
with traditional opposition to authoritarian government.u2 It would
therefore seem desirable that a respondent in an FTC prosecution
be subjected to the same conditions in a subsequent private damage
action as a respondent in a Justice Department prosecution, if private suits are to become a more effective weapon of antitrust enforcement.
51. Biclcs, supra note 49, at 8. If the private litigant's problems are made easier
by increasing the scope of § 5 aid, an argument might be made in favor of giving
the trial judge discretion to reduce the award from the automatic treble damages
which were thought necessary to induce injured parties to assert their claims.
52. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL,
167, 168 (1958).

